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THE CHANGING PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE
OF THE WORLD COURT
J. Patrick Kelly*
INTRODUCTION

Over the last several months, both the United States' and a new
player on the international legal stage, the Soviet Union, 2 have made
announcements about submitting disputes to the World Court. Both
countries have indicated an interest in doing so when the meaning of
certain multilateral treaties that contain provisions referring disputes
to the World Court is involved. Neither country is suggesting that it
would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 3 A declaration
accepting compulsory jurisdiction would expose each nation to broad
categories of disputes involving uncertain and contested principles of
customary international law.
This hopeful but modest step must be contrasted with the recent
U.S. withdrawal 4 of its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court and its withdrawal from the proceedings 5 in
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law; Director, Nairobi International
Law Institute; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1972.
1.N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at A 1l,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (interpretation of Human Rights conventions).
3. States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by filing a
declaration recognizing, in advance, the Court's jurisdiction for matters included within the declaration and not specifically reserved. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
art. 36(2). It provides:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jursidiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
Jurisdiction may be conferred on the Court in three ways: by compulsory jurisdiction, by a
special agreement between the parties, or by a provision within a treaty referring disputes concerning the treaty to the Court. Id. art. 36; see also 1984-85 I.C.J.Y.B. 54-57 (1985) (explaining
bases of Court's jurisdiction).
4. U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67 (Jan.
1986).
5. U.S. Withdrawalfrom the ProceedingsInitiated by Nicaraguain the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (Mar. 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985).
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the Nicaraguav. U.S. case. 6 These actions have precipitated a crisis of
confidence in the Court and stimulated a small cottage industry of
books 7 and law review articles8 addressing the question whether the
United States should, in some measure, re-accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
The underlying premise of the vast majority of these writers is that
increased participation in the World Court will help resolve many
types of disputes and thereby promote respect for the Court and international law. A new declaration by the United States, however, would
be a triumph of form over substance. The United States has never
effectively accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 9 and
many proposals to re-accept it are similarly illusory.' 0
More importantly, the compulsory jurisdiction system assumes a
level of agreement on both the substantive content of customary international law" and on the process of norm creation12 that does not
exist in the modern world. A shared perspective on the content and
process of international law, if it ever existed, has evaporated in the
twentieth century. The new nations of the Third World, representing
the majority of the world's people, have posed two fundamental challenges to the structure of international law. First, they argue that they
are not bound by customary norms to which they have never consented and have specifically opposed, and second, they argue that
U.N. resolutions are a new source for creating international legal
norms. In such a maelstrom, it is not simply that the application of
international law is difficult to predict - the substantive norm to be
6. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction: Nov. 26).
7. See, e.g., T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986); THE UNITED STATES AND
THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (A. Arend ed.
1986) [hereinafter COMPULSORY JURISDICTION]; THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT

A CROSSROADS (L. Damrosch ed. 1987) [hereinafter CROSSROADS]. In a related book Richard
Falk more directly addresses the role of the Court in international law and the reasons for its
disuse. R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986).
8. See, e.g., D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General
Compulsory Jurisdictionof the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (1986); D'Amato, Modifying

U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385
(1985); Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1 (1988); Morrison,
Reconsidering United States Acceptance of the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 148 WORLD AFF. 63
(1985); Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1986); Kelly, The InternationalCourt of Justice.
Crisis and Reformation, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 342 (1987); Appraisalsof the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77-183 (1987).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 67-77.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
I1. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
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applied is itself indeterminate.1 3
The opinion by the majority of the World Court in the Nicaragua
case has exposed the underlying disagreements among nations about
how international law is formed. There, the Court adopted the position, long advocated by Third World nations, that General Assembly
resolutions may create norms of international law and that consent to
such resolutions may be understood as acceptance of the stated norms'
validity. ' 4 While generally unnoticed in the furor over the Court's interpretation of the law of force, its process innovation may be, in the
long run, more important and controversial.
The Nicaraguacase demonstrates that conclusions in international
law about the content of norms depend upon the decisionmaker's perspective about customary international law and upon the theory of
norm creation applied by the decisionmaker. Forcing the Court to
articulate legal principles when there is no consensus, but, indeed persistent acrimony over the content and process of many areas of international law, misjudges the appropriate role of the International Court
of Justice in the development of international law and would undermine rather than promote the goals of the various authors.
Two approaches have emerged in recent American literature as to
the appropriate United States attitude toward the World Court: (1)
the re-acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction with various reservations
to preserve vital American interests; and (2) the preservation of the
status quo premised on a perception that the World Court is biased or
misguided, while promoting the United States government's perspective on international law.
This article argues that neither approach comes to terms with the
wide disagreements about content and process in the international
community. Both fail to promote the goals of an enhanced World
Court or a better international legal order. The Court's compulsory
jurisdiction cannot be saved by clever draftsmanship. Well-designed
reservations offer hope for today's problem, but the Court's process
innovation and fundamental disagreements about the content of many
norms promise further cracks in a legal order facing a crisis of
legitimacy.
13. This is not an indeterminacy inherent in legal reasoning or theory because legal rules are
malleable, a point of view held by many critical legal studies adherents. See, e.g., Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); but see Stick, Can
Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986). Rather, the concern is that the rules
themselves cannot be determined in many areas of international law because nations disagree
about the content of the rules and the process of rule formation.
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (Merits: June 27).
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A viable World Court and a more legitimate international legal
order can only be accomplished by sovereign nations undertaking the
difficult and painful task of redefining customary international legal
principles through multilateral treaty negotiations. These goals cannot be accomplished by the World Court, nor will they be accomplished by the predominance of the perspective of any one nation or
group of nations.
Part I introduces the proposals and perspectives regarding compulsory jurisdiction championed by American international law scholars
and practitioners in several recent books and articles. Part II demonstrates that the United States has never effectively accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and argues that a number of the
proposals for re-acceptance are similarly illusory. Part III addresses
the numerous disagreements about the content of the norms of international law and the Court's limited capacity and authority to resolve
these disagreements. Part IV discusses the fundamental disagreements
about the legitimate processes of international law formation and the
Court's process innovation in the Nicaraguacase. Part V discusses the
need for a universal jurisprudence in a world divided by the provincial
perspectives of nations that manipulate principles for short-term ends.
Finally, in Part VI, an evolution towards a more legitimate process of
norm creation is suggested.
I.

PROPOSALS AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE RE-ACCEPTANCE OF
COMPULSORY JURISDICTION

In a series of recent books and articles, American international law
scholars have discussed the merits of United States participation in the
compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. The explicit analysis includes various perspectives on the bias or objectivity of the Court, the
degree to which certain subject matter is reserved for, or is more appropriately considered by, the Security Council than by the World
Court, and the effectiveness of various techniques, such as reservations
or special chambers procedures,' 5 in limiting the United States' exposure to an acceptable degree. Implicit in these suggestions, however,
are assumptions about the content of international law and the accepted processes for its formation that are under challenge by the majority of nations of the world.
15. The formation of ad hoc chambers or panels of judges to decide specific disputes is authorized by article 26 of the Court's statute. The number of judges on the chamber is to be
determined by the Court with the approval of the parties. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE art. 26. See Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987).
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Thomas M. Franck, one of the most prolific and original thinkers
about international law today, has written a useful and timely book,
Judging the World Court.t6 His volume surveys the history of the
United States' participation in the compulsory jurisdiction system, delineates the advantages and disadvantages of international adjudication, and recommends a limited commitment to compulsory
jurisdiction. Building a case for increased utilization of the Court,
Franck points out that the United States remains subject to the
Court's authority under more than 60 multilateral treaties that specifically refer disputes arising under them to the International Court of
Justice.' 7 He argues that law and the legal process are conservative
institutions that promote the United States' interest in the development of principled, consistent, normative behavior in areas such as the
suppression of terrorism, freedom of the seas, and protection of foreign
investments.' 8 He therefore recommends that the United States
should re-accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction subject to several
important qualifications.
Noting that the United States is unwilling to relinquish control
over its essential national interests, Franck would reserve from the
Court's jurisdiction disputes involving hostilities, armed conflict, and
individual and collective self-defense. 19 Such a reservation would remove the Nicaragua situation, the invasion of Grenada, and other use
of force incidents from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Franck
would further qualify the declaration by permitting the United States,
along with the other states party to a dispute, to choose the panel of
judges through the special chambers procedure successfully used in
the Gulf of Maine case, 20 and to request the Court to render a decision
limited to a declaration of applicable legal principles rather than to
decide the dispute. He would, as would most of the authors in these
collections, eliminate the self-judging Connally reservation that excludes matters of domestic jurisdiction "as determined by the United
2
States." '
16. T. FRANCK, supra note 7.
17. Id. at 28.
18. Id. at 65. While I agree that judicial settlement is in the United States' interest, Parts III
and IV demonstrate that the conditions for consistent principled development of customary international norms are not yet present.

19. His proposal for a new declaration is found in Appendix B. Id. at 111412.
20. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984

I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
21. Senator Connally of Texas introduced the amendment to the Senate Resolution confirming the U.S. Declaration that reserves matters of domestic jurisdiction. Declaration Recognizing
As Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1

U.N.T.S. 9.
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The United States and the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International Court of Justice2 2 and The InternationalCourt of Justice at a
Crossroads23 are collections of specially commissioned papers by outstanding international legal scholars addressing the merits of the
United States' participation in the compulsory jurisdiction system.
Professor Sohn, understanding that the United States may not wish to
limit its military options, would exclude disputes affecting the national
security or those involving a state party to a collective security arrangement with the United States from compulsory jurisdiction. 24 He
counsels against the United States terminating its acceptance of jurisdiction as a relinquishment of leadership toward a better world. Sohn
argues against any self-judging reservation because it could be used
reciprocally by other nations to prevent jurisdiction in any litigation
brought by the United States.
Professor Morrison, one of the counsel for the United States in
Nicaragua v. United States, would exclude cases of armed hostilities
and "matters which are properly exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the Security Council."' 25 He finds that proposals to limit acceptance of
jurisdiction to special chambers chosen by the parties are inconsistent
with a general declaration accepting jurisdiction. 26 The special chambers procedure could be utilized more effectively by an ad hoc special
agreement without compulsory jurisdiction. Such a procedure, he
points out, is presently available to all nations, and would permit the
parties to stipulate the exact question for decision.
Alone 27 among the authors of these volumes, Professor Reisman
would remove the United States from the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court.28 He argues that changes in both the Court's composition
(more judges from Asia and Africa) and in the substantive law that
reflect notions of distributive justice rather than effective power have
22. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION, supra note 7.
23. CROSSROADS, supra note 7.

24. Sohn, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court and the United States Position: The
Need to Improve the United States Declaration, in COMPULSORY JURISDICTION, supra note 7, at
15-16.
25. Morrison, Potential Revisions to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International Court of Justice by the United States of America, in COMPULSORY JURISDICTION, supra
note 7, at 61.
26. Id. at 59-60.
27. Rostow in his article is unclear on this point. See Rostow, Disputes Involving the Inherent Right of Self-Defense, in CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 264. A few other American international legal scholars have similar concerns, but would protect United States interests through
reservations or the use of special chambers procedures. See Leigh and Ramsey, Confidence in the
Court: It Need Not Be a Hollow Chamber, in CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 106.
28. Reisman, Termination of the United States Declaration Under Article 36(2) of the Statute
of the InternationalCourt, in COMPULSORY JURISDICTION, supra note 7, at 73.
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led to a decline in United States influence at the Court. 29 The only
practical option, he asserts, in these circumstances, is withdrawal from
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The United States government
arrived at a similar conclusion in its statement explaining the U.S.
30
withdrawal from the Nicaragua case, but in less temperate tones.
The statement accused the Court of "misreading and distortion of the
31
evidence and precedent."'
In a recent article 32 criticizing the Nicaragua decision, Reisman
has gone so far as to question the desirability of the United States'
continued participation in treaty regimes that refer disputes arising
under the treaty to the Court. 33 He is concerned that the Court's interpretation of its jurisdiction in the Nicaraguacase 34 may portend an
expansive interpretation of the subject matter of such treaties that has
35
heretofore limited the jurisdiction of the Court.
In Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace
through Law, 36 Thomas Franck and Jerome Lehrman argue that there

have been two conflicting traditions of American attitudes toward international adjudication, each of which found expression in the U.S.
Declaration. The messianic vision, which states that disputes should

be settled by law rather than war, appeared to triumph with the passage of the Declaration. Yet, the chauvinistic tradition of untrammeled sovereignty found expression in the Connally Reservation
undermining the commitment of the United States to compulsory jurisdiction. The authors argue that, to achieve the messianic goals, its
proponents must find appropriate substantive areas for international
adjudication and must design tribunals whose judges will give fair con37
sideration to American interests.
Professor Leo Gross analyzes the frequent use of reservations by
29. Id. at 86-94.
30. U.S. Withdrawal from the ProceedingsInitiated by Nicaragua in the InternationalCourt
of Justice, supra note 5, at 64; see also U.S. Decision to Withdrawfrom the InternationalCourt of
Justice: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Human Rights and InternationalOrganizations of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 21, 26, 30 (1985) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of State).
31. US. Withdrawal from the ProceedingsInitiated by Nicaragua in the InternationalCourt
of Justice, supra note 5, at 64.
32. Reisman, The Other Shoe Falls: The Future of Article 36(1) Jurisdiction in the Light of
Nicaragua, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 166, 172-73 (1987).
33. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, para. 1.
34. See Reisman, Has the InternationalCourt Exceeded Its Jurisdiction, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
128, 130-31 (1986).
35. CROSSROADS, supra note 7.

36. Franck and Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace
Through Law, in CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 3.
37. Id. at 18.
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states and finds the Court's treatment of them thorough and objective.38 He observes that the United States could have avoided the Nicaragua adjudication by the thoughtful use of reservations without
abandoning its traditional role in promoting peace through law.
Monroe Leigh and Stephen D. Ramsey in their paper, Confidence in
the Court. It Need Not Be a Hollow Chamber,39 argue that the changing composition of the Court to achieve geographic diversity has led to
a perception that the Court is a political, rather than a judicial, body
that acts contrary to U.S. interests. In order to remedy this perceived
partisan character, they propose a U.S. declaration accepting jurisdiction only with regard to disputes submitted to ad hoc special chambers
40
composed of members acceptable to the parties.
In light of the arguments by Michael Reisman, Leigh and Ramsey,
and the Administration, 4' that U.S. interests are not being reviewed
objectively by the Court, Edith Brown Weiss' empirical analysis of the
voting records of judges is instructive. 42 After reviewing earlier studies on the voting patterns of judges, Weiss then analyzed the votes of
all final decisions in contentious cases. She concludes that the record
does not indicate that the Court is biased against the United States or
that it is unduly politicized or factionalized into blocs. 43 The data
reveals a high degree of consensus among the judges. If the Nicaragua
case is excluded, the average correlation of votes by national judges
with votes by the United States judges from 1966 to 1986 is 79%.44
Weiss states that the Nicaragua decision may represent a relatively
unusual disagreement between the judges and the views of the United
States government. Contrasting statistical studies of both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the U.N. General Assembly that demonstrate a
persistent alignment of voting behavior, she finds that the voting record of the International Court of Justice does not indicate that the
45
judges vote in any predetermined way.
Richard Bilder analyzes the advantages (dispositive, impartial,
principled, authoritative, depoliticizing, precedential, and system rein38. Gross, Compulsory Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause: History and Practice, in
supra note 7, at 39.
39. Leigh and Ramsey, supra note 27, at 108.
40. Id. at 117-22.

CROSSROADS,

41. U.S. Withdrawalfrom the ProceedingsInitiated by Nicaragua in the International Court

of Justice, supra note 5.
42. Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in CROSSROADS,
supra note 7, at 123.
43. Id. at 134.
44. Id. at 129.
45. Id. at 132-33.

Fall 19891

Changing Process of International Law

forcing) and the disadvantages (chance of losing, unpredictable, arguably insufficiently impartial, imposed, adversarial; and often
ineffective) of international adjudication. 46 He does not believe that
the decision in the Nicaragua case or in any other case has been the
result of bias for or against a particular party.4 7 He concludes that the
benefits to the U.S. national interest of accepting compulsory jurisdiction far outweigh the risks and that appropriate reservations can be
drawn to protect it from particular risks which are deemed
4
unacceptable.
The Crossroadsvolume also addresses whether certain kinds of disputes (political or armed conflict) are inappropriate for judicial resolution by the Court and whether certain disputes are more properly
within the primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council as asserted by the United States in the Nicaraguan case. Professor Gordon
finds that Article 36(2) of the Court's statute granting jurisdiction in
"all legal disputes ' 49 is descriptive of the categories of disputes, including any question of international law, rather than a limitation on
50
the type of international law questions that the Court may hear.
Thus, he concludes that the Court's statute does not distinguish between acceptable legal disputes and those that are beyond its institutional capacity. 51
Oscar Schachter reviews the thirteen cases involving the use of
armed force brought before the Court, including eight brought by the
United States against unwilling respondents. 52 He concludes that
cases involving the use of force have proven suitable for adjudication
and questions of national security should not be considered non-justiciable if they also present legal questions. 53 He notes, for example,
that the Court in the Tehran Hostages Case54 rejected Iran's political
dispute defense to'the advantage of the United States.
Domingo Acevedo, the Principal Legal Advisor with the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the Organization of American States, analyzes
disputes before the Security Council and regional organizations such
46. Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of InternationalAdjudication, in
supra note 7, at 155.
47. Id. at 168 n.40.
48. Id. at 178-79.
49. Gordon, Legal Disputes Under Article 36(2) of the Statute, in CROSSROADS, supra note 7,
at 222.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force, in CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 223.
53. Id. at 241.
54. Id. at 226.
CROSSROADS,
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as the Organization of American States." He concludes that consideration by such a political body does not make the dispute per se nonjusticiable. 56 The Court has taken a broad view of what constitutes a
justiciable dispute, he reasons, and, therefore, a country that wishes to
prevent adjudication of armed conflict should reserve such subject
57
matter as have other countries.
Contrary to the positions of Gordon, Schachter, and Acevedo,
Professor Eugene Rostow views the Court's decision to take jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case as an attack on the primary responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace. 5 8 He
asserts that the Court does not have the authority to pass on the legality of the use of force since this judgment is left by the Charter to the
Security Council. 59 Rostow views this diminution of the veto rights of
the permanent members of the Security Council as a usurpation of
power by the Court. He concludes that this justifies the termination of
compulsory jurisdiction by the United States.
In their paper, United States Experience at The International Court
of Justice, 60 Anthony D'Amato and Mary Ellen O'Connell examine
the history of United States' participation before the Court in thirteen
contentious cases and fourteen advisory opinions. Their study demonstrates that the U.S. position has prevailed in the vast majority of cases
before the Court. Furthermore, the United States has successfully
used the Court to galvanize world opinion to the U.S. viewpoint in a
number of cases, most particularly in the Tehran Hostages case 6' and
62
the Advisory Opinion on Admission of a State to the United Nations,
much like Nicaragua used the Court in the Nicaragua case. D'Amato
and O'Connell argue that the Nicaragua case should be put in the
55. Acevedo, Disputes Under Consideration by the U.N. Security Council or Regional Bodies,
in CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 242.

56. Id. at 262.
57. Id. at 263.
58. Rostow, supra note 26, at 277.
59. Id. at 277; but see Schachter, supra note 52, at 234-35 (quoting Judge Schwebel's opinion
in Tehran Hostages and the Statement of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State to the
effect that action by the Security Council does not exclude action by the Court); see also Chayes,
Nicaragua, The United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985) (argues
that Nicaragua's claims should not be barred as a political question either under an article III
constitutional analysis or from the perspective of the World Court).
60. D'Amato & O'Connell, United States Experience at the InternationalCourt of Justice, in
CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 403.
61. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1981 I.C.J. 45
(May 12).
62. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 4 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 3).
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broader and positive perspective of the previous 40 years. 63
In recent articles, Professor D'Amato has clearly expressed his
view that the U.S. should re-accept, by a new declaration, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, albeit limited by reservations to protect
American interests. 64 Nevertheless, D'Amato is particularly troubled
by the Court's use of United Nations resolutions which he views as
exhibiting a misunderstanding of the nature of customary law. 65 He
argues that customary law arises out of state practice, not from political documents such as U.N. resolutions, 66 and that there is state practice to support a number of categories of intervention. 67 Here is the
beginning of a recognition that there may be a greater problem in the
international legal order than a temporary concern about the bias of a
particular Court panel or the inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court.
II.

THE VIABILITY OF COMPULSORY JURISDICTION

All of the international legal scholars mentioned above, with the
exception of Michael Reisman and perhaps Eugene Rostow, favor the
United States' re-acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction,
qualified by various reservations to protect vital American interests.
This appears to be the overwhelming sentiment of our nation's most
distinguished international law scholars. 6 8 The inchoate hope is that
greater participation in the compulsory jurisdiction system will increase utilization of the Court and thereby expand international legal
doctrine and respect for international law. History belies such a
prospect.
Despite appearances to the contrary, the United States has never
effectively accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and arguably,
neither has any other major country. The Connally Reservation,
which excludes domestic jurisdiction matters from the Court's jurisdiction, permits the United States to determine for itself whether the
dispute is a domestic one. This reservation is well known and de63. D'Amato & O'Connell, supra note 60, at 421-22.
64. See D'Amato, supra note 8.
65. D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 102 (1987).
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id. at 103.
68. See Letter from Anthony D'Amato and Keith Highet in N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986, at 26,
col. 4 (on behalf of over 40 of the most distinguished American scholars and experts on international law expressing the view that ". . . the U.S. should re-establish its long standing commitment to international law and the peaceful settlement of international disputes by carefully
considering the adoption of a new or amended instrument of adherence to the World Court's
compulsory jurisdiction").
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nounced by Franck, Sohn, D'Amato, and others. It is less well known
that the United States has, on two occasions, used this reservation arbitrarily to oust the Court from jurisdiction in international matters,
not domestic ones.
In the Interhandel case, 69 the government of Switzerland argued
on behalf of a Swiss corporation that the release of the corporation's
assets in the United States was required by a multilateral agreement.
The United States invoked the Connally Reservation and argued, "this
determination.., is not subject to review or approval by any tribunal.
It [the exercise of the reservation] operates to remove definitively from
the jurisdiction of the Court the matter it determines. After the
United States of America has made such a determination ... the sub'' 70
ject-matter of the determination is not justiciable.
In the Aerial Incident case, 7 1 the United States sued Bulgaria for
violations of international law in the downing of an Israeli aircraft
with U.S. citizens on board. Bulgaria raised the Connally Reservation
reciprocally as a defense to prevent the Court's jurisdiction. Thereupon, the Legal Advisor to the State Department, on behalf of the
United States, asked the Court to dismiss the proceeding rather than
have the Court place a good faith limitation on the reservation. The
Legal Advisor's letter to the Court made it clear that the United
States' position is that it is an escape hatch from the Court's jurisdiction. The letter stated "[A] determination under [the Connally] reservation ... that a matter is essentially domestic constitutes an absolute
ban to jurisdiction irrespective of the propriety or arbitrarinessof the
1
determination.' 72
D'Amato, 73 as have others in the past, 74 argues that the Court
could exercise its powers to limit the reservation to a reasonable invocation. However, the legislative history of the reservation suggests
that no such good faith limitation was intended. 7" The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in opposing such a reservation warned that this
limitation was illusory. 76 As indicated above, the United States gov69. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 21).
70. 1959 I.C.J. Pleadings 452-53 (U.S. Oral Argument).
71. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulg.), 1960 I.C.J. 146 (May 30).
72. 1960 I.C.J. Pleadings 677 (letter of May 12, 1960 from Legal Advisor to Department of
State to Registrar of Court).
73. CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 413.
74. See Henkin, The Connally Reservation Revisited and, Hopefully, Contained, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 374 (1971).

75. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 356.
76. S. REP. No. 1835, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946).
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ernment has argued before the Court its view that the reservation may
be invoked arbitrarily and its determination is not justiciable.
The World Court, unlike a domestic court, acquires jurisdiction
only to the extent a sovereign state has consented to jurisdiction in its
declaration. 77 The inescapable conclusion both from the legislative
history and the history of the reservation's use is that the United
States never granted the Court the jurisdiction to decide the meaning
of the term "domestic jurisdiction." Judge Lauterpacht had it right
thirty years ago in his separate opinion in the Interhandel case when
he wrote,, "it is impossible for the Court to apply the reservation [Connally] in question . . . [because], in consequence thereof, the instrument [U.S. Declaration] in which it is contained is not an instrument
conferring legal rights and creating legal obligations." 78
A declaration without such a self-judging reservation would, of
course, remove the impediment to validity found in the now withdrawn declaration. However, it is unlikely that a government which
has never fully accepted compulsory jurisdiction in the first place
would eliminate such an escape hatch under an administration that
perceives the Court to be biased against it and fundamentally wrong in
79
its interpretation of international law.
The scholars who propose a new declaration qualified by the special chambers procedure must perceive that an effective declaration
will not be forthcoming. The proposals by Thomas Franck, Monroe
Leigh, and others, to permit the United States to choose the panel of
Judges would resurrect the Connally Reservation in a new guise. A
reservation requiring the special chambers procedure would permit
the United States or, reciprocally, the other party-litigant, to escape
compulsory jurisdiction by rejecting the panel. If the co-litigant is a
nation with a different perspective on the content and process of international law, agreement on a panel is unlikely. If the co-litigants have
similar perspectives, then, as Professor Morrison suggests, 80 jurisdiction is essentially voluntary and could have been obtained under the
special agreement procedures of article 36(1) without the pretense of
compulsory jurisdiction.
Moreover, an examination of the practice of other nations reveals
77. See generally S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
(1965).
78. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.) 1959 I.C.J. 6106 (Mar. 21) (dissenting opinion of H.
Lautherpacht) (Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust local remedies without
reaching this issue).
79. See supra note 30.
80. COMPUSORY JURISDICTION, supra note 7, at 59-60.
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the historical decline of compulsory jurisdiction. 81 Nearly all existing
declarations filed with the Court are so hampered by reservations and
conditions that only a handful of nations could be held to compulsory
jurisdiction. 82 Twenty-one of the forty-six declarations are terminable
upon notice.8 3 The United Kingdom, the only permanent member of
the U.N. Security Council still accepting compulsory jurisdiction, has
twice terminated its declaration to substitute a more restrictive one in
order to avoid potential adjudication. 84 Many of the other declarations contain reservations severely restricting either the subject matter
or the time period'of disputes subject to adjudication. The major economic and military powers, including France, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and West Germany, are not members of the compulsory
jurisdiction system.
One further dose of realism is in order. Respondents in the last
eight contentious cases, not based on a voluntary special agreement,
have chosen either not to appear at some stage of the proceedings or
not to comply. 85 This is not to say that international adjudication is
not a valuable dispute resolution technique. It has frequently been
successful on an ad hoc voluntary basis under article 36(1) of the
Court's statute. The United States government has referred several
such disputes to the Court in recent years.8 6 Rather, compulsory jurisdiction has not worked in practice; indeed it has never been tried.
III.

THE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE NORMS AND
THE ROLE OF THE COURT

One could be unpersuaded by this "Emperor Has No Clothes"
form of argument if there were a reasonable prospect of the Court
deciding disputes, elucidating international legal doctrine, and thereby
enhancing respect for itself and international law. Contrary to the as81. See Waldock, Decline of the Optional Clause, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 244 (1955-56);
Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 87 (1979); Kelly, supra note 8.
82. See generally Kelly, supra note 8, at 351-61.
83. Id. at 352-54.
84. See Waldock, supra note 81, at 268; Merrills, supra note 81, at 94.
85. These cases include the two Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v.
Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 17), Fisheries Jurisdiction (W. Ger. v.
Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 30 (Aug. 17); the two Nuclear Test cases, Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973
I.C.J. 99 (June 22), Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.CJ. 135 (June 22); Trail of Pakistani
Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 347 (Dec. 15); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19); the Iran Hostages case, United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); and the Nicaragua case Military
and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits:
June 27).
86. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 3 (Mar. 3).
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sumption of many of these authors, there are fundamental disagreements among nations about the substantive norms of customary
international law and how such norms are made. These disagreements
call into question the very legitimacy of the international legal order
itself. It is both inappropriate and destructive to burden a powerless
court with fundamental problems of law content and formation that
are in the exclusive domain of sovereign states.
American and other domestic lawyers tend to view the World
Court and, indeed, international law, through the prism of the United
States Supreme Court and a domestic legal system with a written constitution and a history of shared values. These analogies are
inapposite.
International law is created by the general consent of sovereign
states as expressed in customary rules of international law and in treaties specifying legal obligations between the parties. 87 Lacking a central authority, legislature, or Supreme Court to articulate legal norms,
international legal norms are created by the interactions of equal sovereign states. Customary law is created through consistent state practice accepted as law. While there is no generally accepted definition of
customary law, it contains at least two crucial elements: (1) the quantitative element of state actions indicating that the asserted norm is the
practice of states; and (2) a psychological element, the opinio juris re88
quirement, by which states recognize that the norm is obligatory.
Since international law is the positive creation of sovereign states
in order to limit their behavior in their perceived mutual self-interests,
the role of the World Court, or any court, in developing international
law is severely constrained. There is no institution with the authority
to definitively articulate binding norms of international law. The articulation of new norms or the expansion of existing norms by a Court
89
violates the consensual foundations of international law.
The existential conundrum of the international legal order is how
it is possible to know the content of customary international law in a
decentralized system without an authoritative institution to articulate
norms. What weight should be given to the World Court's conclusion
87. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art.

38, para. 1; see also I

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
88. See, e.g., A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, chs. 3-4

(1971).
89. The common consent of states, not the actual consent of each state, is thought sufficient.
See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (3d ed. 1979); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedureof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 1951-1954. General Principles
and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 68 (1953). But see G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-16 (1974) (Soviet scholar and diplomat argues that a concordance of

wills of states is required to create a norm).
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that a given norm of customary international law exists? Does it matter that a state or a group of states asserts that such a norm does not
exist? How does one resolve such a controversy? There are no objectively verifiable answers without a theory of how customary law is
formed and of the relative weight of different types of state practice,
international adjudication, and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
Unfortunately, different nations have different perspectives on how
norms are formed, on what kinds of actions constitute state practice,
and on how one determines whether the stated norm is obligatory
(opiniojuris). There is no commonly accepted understanding of any of
these concepts.
Apart from these theoretical problems with the Court assuming an
important law-creating function, there are a number of significant
practical legal problems.
1. The Court lacks the legal authority to perform a major lawcreating function. Article 38 of the Court's statute requires the Court
to apply international law that is defined by the actions of states. 90
Judicial decisions are only a subsidiary means for determining the
rules of law. 9' Even this modest recognition is limited by article 59
which declares that decisions of the Court have no binding force except between the parties. 92 There is no doctrine of stare decisis at the
Court.
2. The Court's jurisdiction is limited and consensual, characterized by a reluctance to extend jurisdiction when none has been specifically conferred. 93 Under the Court's statute, states confer jurisdiction
by ad hoc special agreements concerning a particular dispute or by
prior consent either through declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction or by specific treaties referring disputes to the Court. 94 With a
severely limited jurisdiction, the Court is necessarily a passive, reactive
institution dependent on nations to refer disputes. Few states have
chosen to do so.
3. The jurisprudence of the Court has been severely limited by
the reluctance of states to submit disputes. Only forty disputes have
38, para. 1.
91. Id. art. 38, para. l(d).
92. Id. art. 59. The Court often cites its former cases. However, they are not considered
conclusive evidence of the law. See Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106
90. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art.

RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 91-92 (1962).
93. See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

94.

91 (1958).

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art.

36.
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been submitted in forty years. 95
There is, of course, inherently some discretion in the process of law
finding either through interpreting treaties or finding and defining custom. However, the source of the norms to be interpreted is the states
that have consented to the norm in a treaty or created the norm
through the process of customary international law, not decisions of
the World Court. Decisions of the Court bind the parties, but such
decisions are declarative of international law only to the extent that
the opinions accurately reflect custom or treaties created by the positive acts of states.
The Nicaraguacase, 96 which is the genesis of this debate, raises the
fundamental disagreement between the United States government and
the majority of nations about the broad substantive area of the use of
force. The circumstances of the case itself involved the confluence of
the prohibition against the use of force found in article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter 97 and the principle of collective self-defense
contained in article 51. 98 The Court determined that the Multilateral
Treaty, Reservation in the U.S. Declaration excluded claims under the
U.N. Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States,
but did not bar claims under customary international law and other
sources. 99
The United States in defending its activities against the Nicaraguan government argued that the mining of the harbor, arming of the
Contras, and other activities were the permissible exercise of the right
of collective self-defense in protection of El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica. I°0 In order to invoke the right of collective self-defense,
the Court required that El Salvador be the victim of an "armed attack" which must involve the sending of armed forces across international boundaries or a similar threat to the political integrity of El
Salvador.' 0 t This is contrary to the U.S. government's position that
indirect aggression by Nicaragua, Libya, or other nations justifies an
armed intervention by the United States regardless of whether an
95. I.C.J. cases are counted in different ways, because one dispute may involve several applications. Professor Gross lists forty contentious cases, excluding "unilateral arraignments," in
which the applicant knew there was no basis for jurisdiction. See generally Gross, Compulsory
Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause, in CROSSROADS, supra note 7, at 19-57.
96. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (Merits: June 27).
97. U.N. CHARTER art. 2., para. 4.
98. Id. art. 51.
99. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 1.C.J. at 38.
100. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 70-72.
101. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 119-23.
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armed attack has occurred. 10 2
The World Court rejected the justification of collective self-defense
by a vote of twelve to three and decided, by a similar vote, that the
training, arming, equipping, financing, and supplying of the Contras
by the United States violated its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another state 0 3 and not to
use force against another state.' °4 By a vote of fourteen to one, the
U.S. judge dissenting, the World Court found that the United States
had breached its obligation under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Nicaragua and its obligation to warn of
05
the existence and location of the mines.
The breadth of this disagreement should not be underestimated.
The United States government's view about the appropriate use of
force is diametrically opposed by the overwhelming majority of judges
on the World Court including a number of Western judges. Without
the participation of the United States at the merits stage, we lack a
clear articulation of the U.S. view on when the use of force is permitted. However, statements by U.S. officials and actions by the U.S.
government indicate a view that an actual armed attack is not required
to justify intervention and that retaliation for terrorist attacks includ06
ing preemptive action will be taken. 1
There are also a number of indications that the United States' disagreement with the World Court on the content of the law of force
extends beyond the doctrine of self-defense. The Court in its judgment
examined other justifications for armed intervention to ensure that it
was not overlooking a defense that the United States might have
presented if it participated in the merits phase. 10 7 The Court specifically rejected any new right of intervention in support of an opposition
102. See Reagan: "We Have a Right to Help, " TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 16; Transcript of
Address by Reagan on Libya, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al0, cols. 1-4 (justifying attack on
Libyan territory as preemptive strike on terrorist facilities); SandinistasAssail Reagan's Threat,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1986, at 8, col. 6 (President Reagan's statement that a takeover of Nicaragua may be necessary); Address by Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to U.N., National Press
Club, Washington D.C. (May 20, 1985) (asserting right to arm pro-democratic insurgents); see
also Moore, The Secret War in CentralAmerica and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 43, 83 (1986) (Professor Moore, Special Counsel for the United States during the jurisdictional
phase of Nicaraguav. U.S., argues that armed attack is not required under correct interpretation
of article 51, and, even if required, self-defense against "secret" or "indirect" armed attacks is
permitted).
103. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 146 (Merits: June 27).
104. Id. at 147.
105. Id. at 147-48.
106. See supra note 29.
107. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 106.
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force within another state 0 8 or past U.S. justifications for interventions in connection with a state's ideology or domestic policy.' 0 9
The Court placed particular emphasis on the principle of non-intervention, defining it as prohibiting states from intervening directly or
indirectly in the internal or external affairs of other states, including
coercion to affect the choice of a state's political, economic, social and
cultural system."t0 The Court also explicitly rejected intervention to
enforce or ensure respect for human rights in Nicaragua and to enforce a legal commitment made to the Organization of American
States. I' I
D'Amato and O'Connell" t2 excoriate the President of the World
Court, Judge T. 0. Elias, for denouncing the invasion of Grenada as
contrary to the rule of law."t 3 For these authors, it is one of several
indications of possible bias. What is most telling about that interview,
and indeed a startling revelation in the Court's opinion, is that the
views of the majority of members of the World Court on a whole range
of law of force issues are far different from those of the U.S. government.t 14 As Judge Elias' remarks suggest, the disagreement extends
beyond the concept of self-defense to include the extent to which customary forms of intervention have survived the U.N. Charter. Indeed,
the views of the U.S. government on intervention are at variance with
those of many Western international law experts 1 5 and most governments of the world. 1 6 Even the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
108. Id. at 109-10.
109. Id. at 109. It is unclear whether the Court was directing its comments at statements of
the U.S. government such as that of Ambassador Kirkpatrick. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 10;
see also Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing CharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 642, 643-44 (1984); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD

PUBLIC ORDER (1961). The discredited Brezhnev Doctrine is a similar ideological assertion of a
right to intervene. Text of Pravda Article Justifying Invasion of Czechoslovakia, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1323 (1968).
110. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 107-08 (Merits: June 27).
111. Id. at 130-35. But see Teson, Le People C'est Moil The World Court and Human
Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (1987) (author wishes to preserve "right" to intervene for human
rights purposes, but agrees that the Nicaragua situation, on these facts, does not justify use of
force).
112. D'Amato & O'Connell, supra note 60, at 403-21.
113. The interview in the Hague by the Associated Press was quoted by Judge Schwebel in
his dissent. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 314-15 (Merits: June 27).
114. For the position of the U.S. government, see Robinson, Letter from the Legal Advisor,
United States Departmentof State, 18 INT'L LAW. 381 (1984) (explains legal basis for U.S. action
in Grenada).
115. See, e.g., Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1620
(1984); Rowles, "Secret Wars," Self-Defense and the Charter- A Reply to ProfessorMoore, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 568 (1986).

116. The Security Council voted 11 to 1(U.S. against) for a resolution condemning the inter-
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Grenada, a committee of the American Bar Association's Section of
International Law and Practice, found that the United States intervention in Grenada was incompatible with the U.N. Charter, the Rio
7
Treaty, and the Charter of the Organization of American States."l
Whatever the merits of these arguments, it is clear that the U.S. government's position on a broad range of law of force issues is at variance with those of most nations of the world and is a minority view
8
even within the U.S. international law community." t
Asking Judge Elias to recuse himself would not alter the large discrepancy between the U.S. government's point of view on the law of
intervention and that of other nations of the world whose views are
reflected on the World Court. Given the trend toward geographic balance, even replacing Judge Elias on the Court would have little effect.
Indeed all the Judges, except the Judge from the United States, Steven
Schwebel, found that the United States had violated its bilateral treaty
with Nicaragua, had failed to warn of the existence and location of the
mines, and had an obligation to make reparations." 19
The general charges of bias against the Court are erroneous, as
Edith Brown Weiss' historical analysis 20 and the overwhelming vote
of the Court, including the Western judges, suggest. The problem is
not one of bias, but of different perspectives about international law
and ultimately of values. 12' Judges on the World Court, unlike U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, reflect their country's and their own experience. With many government officials and scholars from a larger pool
of countries being appointed to the Court as judges, it is hardly surprising that the Court reflects a wider spectrum of views. The United
States, the world's largest military power, appears to intend to preserve its military option in world affairs and does not appear willing to
accept interpretations of the law of force that limit its ability to do
So. 122 A reservation excluding armed hostilities, national security, or
vention in Grenada as a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Grenada. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 4. The vote in
the U.N. General Assembly to condemn the U.S. action was 108 to 9. Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1983,
at AI, col. .1.
117. InternationalLaw and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L LAW.

331, 380 (1984).
118. Id.; see also InternationalLawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1984) (statement of nine prominent professors of international law).
119. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 147-49 (Merits: June 27).
120. Weiss, supra note 42.
121. See COMPULSORY JURISDICTION, supra note 7, at 152-53 (statement of Mahnoush Arsanjani, Legal Officer, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs).
122. See supra note 102; see also US. Withdrawalfrom the ProceedingsInitiated by Nicaragua in the InternationalCourt of Justice, supra note 5, at 64.
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other law of force issues would then be a necessary predicate to any
new declaration.
Such a limited subject matter reservation will not solve the fundamental problem of different perspectives about the content of international law. In many other substantive areas, the rift between the U.S.
view of international law and that of other countries is, at least,
equally wide. During the recent redrafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations, the standard of compensation for expropriation was
hotly disputed. The reporters in the early drafts argued that the Restatement's (Second) formulation of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation (the Hull standard), while continuing to be the position
of the United States government, could not be considered international
law applicable to all cases of expropriation. 123 Recent state practice
and U.N. resolutions indicate that other factors must be considered in
some circumstances. 124 After pressure from the U.S. State Department 25 and the private bar, 126 the old Hull formulation was finally
27
adopted in the Restatement (Third).
The position espoused by the vast majority of nations is far different than either position within the narrow American debate. Third
World nations argue that there is no international minimum standard
of compensation, rather it is a matter of domestic law.' 28 International legal scholars from the Third World challenge the traditional
standard from a variety of different bases.' 29 This evolving debate is
affecting Western international legal scholars, 3 0 even though a modifi123. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 712, comment e and Reporters' note I (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982).
124. See Schachter, Compensationfor Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121-22 (1984) (article by an advisor to the Reporters explaining the import of the Reporters' note).
125. See Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176
(1984) (Legal Advisor to State Department argues that the traditional standard remains law).
126. See, e.g., Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the Revised Restatement,!25
VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1984).
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
(1987).
128. Latin-American nations have argued for a standard of equal treatment with nationals
since the turn of the century. See D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 72-73 (1955). In a number of

resolutions of the General Assembly, Third World nations attempted to declare the national
treatment standard as the standard under international law. See, e.g., Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 3 1)at 50, U.N. Doc. A/

9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). The vote on the Charter was 120 for, 6 against
(U.S. and five Western European countries), with 10 abstentions.
129. See, e.g., Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of InternationalLaw, 15 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 55, 63-66 (1966) (new nations argue that they should not
be bound by traditional international law unless they have specifically chosen to be bound);
Sornarajah, Compensationfor Expropriation: The Emergence of New Standards, 13 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 108 (1979).

130. See, e.g., Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property in InternationalLaw: Toward
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cation of the traditional standard did not ultimately prevail in the Restatement (Third).
The international law of compensation for expropriation is at a
stalemate, notwithstanding the positions of the U.S. government and
the Restatement. These different points of view will inevitably find
expression on the World Court. Several judges of the World Court
have already argued in scholarly writings against the traditional international minimum standard. Judge Jim6nez de Arch6ga, former President of the World Court from 1976 to 1979, has argued that the
traditional standard has been altered by the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties and that actual practice indicates that compensation is now governed by the doctrine of unjust enrichment rather than
a right of restitution.' 3' Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria, recently reappointed to a new term, has argued that the international
law of the protection of foreign property formed part of the justification for Western colonial domination and must be changed.1 32 If the
World Court were to hear an investment dispute today, a triumph for
the United States' view of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation would be unlikely at best.
The United States' assumption of the universality of its perspective
on international customary law is a product of our cultural provincialism. Our debates about international law are primarily with ourselves.
When we do interact with foreign nationals about the issues of customary international law, it is primarily with Western Europeans who
for the most part share our perspective and our culture. Yet many of
these rules, such as the standard of compensation for expropriation,
are meant to be applied to the majority of mankind with whom there is
little substantive interchange and even less acceptance.
IV.

THE COURT AND DISPUTES ABOUT THE PROCESS
QF NORM CREATION

Perhaps even more damaging than disagreements about the content of international law to the prospect of effective compulsory jurisdiction, is the disagreement about the process of how international law
is formed. Most of the disputes about the content of international law
occur in areas where norms are defined by customary international
a Consensus or More "Rich Chaos"?, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1975); Dolzer, New Foundationsof the Law of Expropriationof Alien
Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (1981) (German academic).
131. Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned
Property, II N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 179 (1978).
132. M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 98-115 (1979).
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law. Under traditional Western international legal theory, customary
law is the major source of international law.' 3 3 Custom, as evidenced
by state practice accepted as law, has been seen as the triumph of positivism, because it is formed by the observable acts of states that are
responsible for its creation.134 Unfortunately, for those who desire a
rational system of international law, customary law is medieval in its
complexity and ethereal in quality.
The content and scope of customary international law is often uncertain, permitting states to disagree about its existence, content, and
scope.135 Custom may be the product of numerous state practices, not
necessarily consistent and frequently unaccompanied by a statement
describing the norm with any precision. Furthermore, it is not clear
when in time state practice hardens into a rule of international law. Is
contrary state practice a violation of custom or evidence of a new custom? Nor is there agreement about which states are bound by a particular custom. While the consent of states is at the root of custom,
they need not specifically consent. 136 Silence may be read as acquies137
cence, and the silent state bound.
Dwarfing the uncertainties about content are questions concerning
the articulation of international law. Who determines whether a practice has hardened into a custom; who determines what the content of
that custom is; and who determines if a custom has been replaced or
modified? These questions raise different aspects of our existential conundrum - how does one know the content of custom when there is
no authoritative institution to articulate norms? In a decentralized
system, there are a cacophony of conflicting state voices. Such a system is ripe for manipulation and posturing. This is precisely what is
occurring in our present international legal order.
The difficulties in defining norms extend far beyond the ambiguities of international customary law. They include disagreements about
the fundamental processes of law formation in the international system. The emergence of the newly independent nations of the Third
World has created two serious challenges to the structure of interna133. Custom has been seen as the original source of most international legal principles and of
the concept that treaties are binding. See I OPPENHEIM, supra note 87, at 24-28, 880-81.
134. See Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURs 6061 (1985).
135. See discussion concerning laws of force and of the standard of compensation, supra text
accompanying notes 106-111, 123-132.
136. See, e.g., Waldock, supra note 92, at 1, 49-50 (customary law is not a form of tacit
treaty, but rather an independent process applicable to all); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
51-53 (6th ed. 1963).
137. See MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 1954 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 143.
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tional law that cannot be resolved by simplistic assumptions. First,
they argue that new nations are not bound by norms of international
law to which they have never consented and have consistently opposed
as against their interests. Second, they assert that U.N. resolutions
may create or modify norms of international law.
Under traditional Western theory, new states are bound by existing
norms of international law.138 Such nations must take the obligations
of statehood along with its privileges. This "bitter with the sweet"
notion is articulated as a corollary to the universal character of customary law, 13 9 but is not itself a norm of international law. Rather, it
is a rule of convenience that helps create uniformity in the international system. While it may have a certain persuasive quality when a
lone state enters the ranks of sovereign equal states, it loses much of its
force when the new states are in the majority. The non-consenting
states are then arguably bound to norms created by a minority of
states. Such a rule of convenience creates an inequality between those
states that consented to a norm and those that did not because they
did not exist.
The inequality is even more pronounced if one accepts the concept
of the persistent objector. 140 Under this concept, a nation is not bound
to a norm of customary international law, if it objects to the norm
during the period of its formation and consistently thereafter. This
concept has little support in state practice. 14 1 It was recently resurrected in the Restatement'of Foreign Relations (Third), 142 even
14 3
though there Was no similar concept in the Restatement (Second).
If one accepts the principle of the persistent objector, an additional
inequality is added. New nations are bound by old rules of custom,
such as the international minimum standard for expropriation, even
though some older states may have objected to the norm during its
formation and therefore are not bound.
The prime advantage of such an approach is that it prevents the
138. See Waldock, supra note 92, at 52; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 127, § 102,
comment d and § 206, comment a.
139. See Waldock, supra note 92, at 52-53.
140. See Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 127,
§ 102, comment d.
141 There is dicta supporting the concept in the Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J.
116, 131 (Dec. 18), but a paucity of evidence in state practice; see Stein, supra note 140, at 459-

63.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 127, § 102, comment d.
143. Only the issue of-the role of an objecting state in preventing the rule of law from being
formed was addressed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1, comment e (1965).
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United States or a similar country from being bound by any change in
international law if it consistently objects to the new norm. The result
of this confluence of doctrine is that new nations are bound to norms
to which they never consented, even though a single persistent objector may not be bound to such a norm, nor need ever be bound to a
change in customary international law as long as it objects.
This anomaly is further magnified by the historical fact that the
majority of nations representing the vast majority of people on the
globe have come into existence after the formation of most international customary law. If this theory is to be accepted, in a nominally
consensual system the majority of nations are bound even though they
have never consented. Such a situation would be intolerable for the
United States. The resurrection of the concept of the persistent objector in the new Restatement is testament to the fact that the United
States insists that it will be bound only by consent. Yet, if new nations
are bound because custom has become general or universal international law, how can a single objecting state not be bound by universal
international law? What is non-consensual for new nations requires
actual consent from a nation that would object. The emergence of
developing nations has stretched the consensual theory of customary
international law to the -breaking point and has decreased the perceived legitimacy of the rules of customary law.
There is a second fundamental disagreement about the process of
norm formation between most Western nations and the Third World.
They differ sharply about the binding character and legal weight of
United Nations resolutions. Many Western scholars view U.N. resolutions that are declarative of international law as evidence of the
opiniojuris that may play a role in the formation of international customary law. 144 The intent of the states in voting for the resolution and
the extent to which the vote was representative of the opiniojuriscommonus are important factors in weighing this evidence. 145 Others, including Stephen Schwebel, the judge from the United States on 'the
World Court and a former Legal Advisor to the State Department,
argue that. U.N. votes are only recommendations to members even
when they appear to be declaratory of law in form. Before U.N. resolutions can be treated as law, they must be accompanied by actual
state practice.146 Schwebel observes that U.N. representatives may not
speak authoritatively for their governments and that states may vote
144. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 134, at 117.
145. See id. at 117-23.
146. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law, 1979 PROCEEDINGS OF AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 301, 304.
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to please other members rather than with the intent of creating legal
obligations. 147 Prosper Weil, in his influential article, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw,' 4 8 argues that resolutions may
represent a sociological and political trend, but "they do not constitute
the formal source of new norms."
Many nations of the Third World and their theorists argue that
U.N. resolutions that are declarative of law may create legal obligations even for the states who did not vote for the measure. 49 Sometimes this conclusion is reached through treating General Assembly
resolutions as authoritative interpretations of the Charter. 50 At other
times, the same result is achieved by treating resolutions as the practice of the General Assembly implementing the goals of the Charter. 15' Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of the World Court has gone so far
as to argue that U.N. resolutions with their democratic, equalitarian
character are the preferred method for the progressive development of
52
international law. '
The practical result of this theoretical controversy has not necessarily been that Third World judges treat U.N. resolutions as creating
legal obligations. Rather Third World judges, as well as some other
judges, have become more willing to find that international customary
law has been created or changed when there are U.N. resolutions on
point.' 5 3 Such resolutions along with some state practice are more
readily seen as creating international law when scattered or inconsistent state practice alone might not be sufficient.
It is this more facile use of U.N. resolutions in Nicaragua v. U.S.,
not the substantive law of the use of force, that is the central challenge
posed by that opinion to the international legal order as envisioned by
the United States. The majority opinion found by a vote of twelve to
three that the United States by training, arming, equipping, financing,
and supplying the Contra forces had acted in breach of its obligations
under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of
another state or to use force against another state. 15 4 It was necessary
147. Id. at 302.
148. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 417
(1983).
149. Castaneda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of InternationalLaw,
1975 INT'L ORG. 38, 47-48 (1961); M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 132, at 186-92.
150. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, paras. 53-57 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16).
151. See 2 F. GARCIA-ARMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 646
(1984); M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 120-23 (1986).

152. M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 132, at 138-44, 186-92..
153. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 99-104 (Merits: June 27).
154. Id. at 146.

Fall 19891

Changing Process of International Law

for the Court to find a violation of customary international law rather
than of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter because the Multilateral
Treaty Reservation in the U.S. Declaration excluded disputes arising
under a multilateral treaty (U.N. Charter) unless all parties to the
treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the
Court. 155

In finding these principles of customary international law, the
Court relied principally on two General Assembly resolutions: the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations, 156 and the Definition of Aggression.

157

The Court acknowl-

edged that state practice was inconsistent, but found that consent to
these resolutions was an acceptance of the validity of rules declared by
the resolutions. 158 Never before had the Court so clearly indicated
that U.N. resolutions that are declarative of principles of law may create law. Numerous questions arise as to whether acquiescing states as
well as consenting states are bound, what juridical techniques are used
to interpret resolutions, and how one determines which resolutions are
entitled to such legal weight.
The Court's process innovation clarifies that the exposure of the
United States to decisions of the World Court adverse to its conception of international law has become far wider than any reservations
can cloak. Using U.N. resolutions in this manner will, of course, increase the legislative role of the General Assembly, thereby reducing
the control of the United States and other Western nations over the
formation of international law. More significant for our purposes, it
would grant to the World Court a broad law-creating role through its
interpretative function. What kinds of behavior are encompassed by
broad resolutions? Does the U.N. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources change customary international law?
155. "Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to... (c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the
case before the Court, or (a) the United States of America specially agrees to jursidiction ......
Declaration Recognizing as compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, deposited Aug. 26, 1946,
Cal. Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9.
156. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
157. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
158. The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely
that of a "reiteration or elucidation" of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter.
On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of
rules declared by the resolution by themselves .... It would therefore seem apparent that
the attitude referred to expressed an opiniojuris respecting such rule (or set of rules), to be
thenceforth treated separately from the provisions, especially those of an institutional kind,
to which it is subject on the treaty-law plane of the Charter.
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 100.
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What is the effect of the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties
of States on the nations that abstained or opposed it?
These process differences between the Third World and Western
nations are inconsistent and irreconcilable. They affect not only the
institutional capacity of the World Court to resolve conflict; they also
affect the perceived legitimacy of the invocation of international law
by states in international conflict. American international law writers
overstate both the efficacy of the World Court in such an environment
and the extent to which customary norms are perceived by other states
as legitimate.
The Weil article, which is in essence a plea for voluntarism against
the tide of General Assembly majoritarianism,15 9 fails to grapple with
the non-voluntary imposition of customary norms on a growing Third
World. It is precisely this one-sided application of the positivist premise of consent that has the Third World flexing its muscles in these
international institutions where its numbers have influence. It is this
discordance despite the rhetoric of consent that makes one question
the universality of customary intenational law.
V.

TOWARD A UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE

In his insightful volume, Reviving the World Court, 60 Richard
Falk examines the role of the World Court in the development of international law with the stated goal of strengthening international adjudication. Noting that Third World nations have risen to a majority
position in the General Assembly and most U.N. organizations, he
observes that such nations have rarely utilized the Court nor played a
significant role in the development of its jurisprudence. He argues that
the World Court will not be revived until non-Western judges develop
a pluralistic normative jurisprudence that reflects the diverse cultures
and ideologies of the world. 161 This argument forms a prescient justification for the Court's opinion in the Nicaragua case.
Falk's methodology is to critically examine the judicial style of
World Court opinions and the relationship of the Court to world opinion ii the "big case" - a controversy of major significance among
political actors that shapes the perceptions and attitudes of nations
toward the World Court. He chooses, as examples, the Southwest Africa cases and advisory opinions,162 the Tehran Hostages case, 163 and
159. Weil, supra note 148, at 420.
160. R. FALK, supra note 7.
161. Id. at 181.
162. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec.
21), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of July 18: second phase).
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the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion. 164
Most disturbing to Falk was the World Court's 1966 dismissal of
the Ethiopian and Liberian petitions charging South Africa with violations of its obligations to the inhabitants of the territory of Southwest
Africa under the League of Nations mandate. The Court took the
extraordinary step of dismissing the petition, at the merits phase, for
lack of a legal interest (standing) on the part of Ethiopia and Liberia
even though the Court had implicitly dismissed the legal interest challenge at the jurisdictional phase of the proceeding.' 65 The decision
was by a threadbare, statutory majority of 8-7 with the President of
the Court, Sir Percy Spender of Australia, voting twice. 166 There is a
serendipitous quality to this result. Small changes in the composition
of the Court permitted the dissenters in the first phase to write the
majority opinion in the second phase, effectively reversing the
67
decision. 1
The Court's opinion is an example, for Falk, of how the judicial
style and narrow perspective of the Court has significantly impaired its
functioning and isolated it from the majority of nations. First, he observes that the technical, positivist majority opinion had the appearance of scientific objectivity, yet the dissenting opinion of Judge Philip
Jessup of the United States persuasively made technical arguments to
the opposite conclusion.1 68 Second, the Court lost an opportunity to
promote a new normative jurisprudence in the context of a moral and
political consensus against South Africa's actions 1 69 Third, in creating an expectation of a decision on the merits the Court created a rift
170
between it and the political organs of the United Nations.
Turning to the Tehran Hostages case, he criticizes the Court for
avoiding the broader historical circumstances, such as U.S. complicity
in the coup that placed the Shah in power, that form the larger polit7
ical dimensions of the taking of hostages at the American embassy. ' 1
Here one must have doubts about the Court's ability to acquire and
assess the necessary evidence and its competence to make essentially
163. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1981 I.C.J. 45
(May 12).
164. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (Advisory Opinion of July 20).
165. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec.
21), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18: second phase).
166. R. FALK, supra note 7, at 107.
167. Id. at 46-47.
168. Id. at 108-10.
169. Id. at 136.
170. Id. at 50-55, 120.
171. Id. at 14, 153-56.
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political judgments in such a broad context. The Court's opinion in
the Nicaragua case, later lauded by Falk, 172 illustrates the advantages
of focusing on the legal issues in a dispute and defining rights and
obligations that may limit behavior in the context of an ongoing
dispute.
In the Certain Expenses advisory opinion, the General Assembly
requested the Court's advice on whether the expenses for peace keeping operations authorized by the General Assembly were "expenses of
the organization" and therefore could be apportioned by the General
Assembly. Both the Soviet Union and France opposed such an apportionment. In comparing the Court's opinion with its contemporary
decisions in the Southwest Africa cases, Falk observes that "the members of the Court most associated with strict constructionism in the
South West Africa dispute were the principal teleologists in Certain
Expenses.'" 173 He views this decision, despite its technical appearance,
as embodying a broad constitutional expansion in the role of the General Assembly. This expansion, he argues, is contrary to the bargain
struck at the San Francisco Conference during the formation of the
United Nations giving the Security Council responsibility for
peacekeeping operations. Here Falk's concerns are that (1)the narrow, technical judicial style of the opinion masks a fundamental
change in the constitutional structure of the United Nations; and that
(2) the Court is willing to make a large doctrinal leap to further Western hegemony in encouraging peacekeeping operations, yet is unwilling to make a smaller leap in interpreting South Africa's obligations to
174
the inhabitants of South West Africa under the mandate.
The gravamen of his argument through these case studies is that
the opinions contain an invisible jurisprudential paradigm that is positivist in legal style, Western in its use of sources, non-normative and
obtuse in character, and indeterminant. 175 The Western positivist judicill style makes the institution alien to non-Western cultures. The
substance of the decisions grounded in Western hegemony creates an
institution inhospitable to non-Western interests.
What is striking about his conclusion is that it is the mirror image
of Reisman's argument that the changing composition of the Court
has led to a bias against the United States. 1 76 For Falk it is the Western control of the jurisprudential paradigm, i.e., the language of legal
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Falk, The World Court's Achievement, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 106 (1987).
R. FALK, supra note 7, at 157-58.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 179-80.
Reisman, supra note 28.
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debate, that has produced a bias in favor of Western nations. Similarly, the Falk criticism of the Certain Expenses opinion as changing
the authority of the Security Council is mirrored in Rostow's argument that the Court in the Nicaragua case violated the San Francisco
bargain by usurping the Security Council's primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace. 177 The characterization of the
Court's decision appears to depend on whose ox is being gored.
Neither form of pluralism, Third World normative jurisprudence or
Western provincial jurisprudence will, in and of itself, advance respect
for the Court or international law.
The Nicaraguacase is testament to the fact that the Western hegemony at the Court that Falk finds evident in Certain Expenses,
Southwest Africa, and Tehran Hostages has changed, if not reversed.
Neither prospect is encouraging for a system of international law with
universal application. To counter Western cultural control of the
images, language, sources, and jurisprudence of the World Court, Falk
proposed a normative pluralistic jurisprudence that will reflect the
panhumanistic commitments derived from the principles in the U.N.
Charter and the diverse cultural, ideological, and national perspectives
78
throughout the world.'
While sympathetic to Falk's intention of broadening the perspectives and sources available to the Court, the proposal for a normative
pluralistic jurisprudence is a prescription for the disintegration of the
Court not its revival. Which normative principles are to govern particular cases? How are broad principles such as self-determination,
sovereignty, human rights, and the prohibition against the use of force
to be reconciled in various contexts? How will nations be able to predict which principles will be applied and how they will be interpreted?
Will not these broad norms be used to promote one point of view
rather than another? A tilt toward one pluralistic paradigm, arguably
South West Africa or Nicaragua, alienates one group of nations, raises
questions of bias, and encourages the withdrawal of disaffected countries or groups of countries from the World Court. It will not increase
the utilization of the Court or respect for international law.
Forcing the Court to choose amoug clashing pluralistic paradigms
encourages the dissolution of international law. Decisions will be
deemed incorrect, biased, and ultimately ignored as the United States
is attempting to do with the Nicaragua decision. Moreover, a normative approach misjudges the institutional role of the Court. In a de177. Rostow, supra note 27.
178. Falk, supra note 7, at 190-91.
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centralized consensual legal system, the World Court is not the proper
institution to create the legal rules it must apply no matter what group
of nations controls the Court. This is the proper domain of nationstates. If the Court were to set such a course, disaffected states would
view its decisions as illegitimate and would neither comply with its
decisions nor respect the articulated legal principles.
The Third World's primary concern is not that the World Court
uses an alien process in an alien language. Most developing nations
have domestic courts modeled after Western courts, and their lawyers
and judges are often fluent in Western languages as well as indigenous
languages. Their primary concern is that they perceive that the rules
of customary international law reflect the West's self-interest, not their
own, and that those rules have been imposed upon them without their
consent. Nations not included in the process of norm formulation understandably view them as illegitimate and lack a commitment to
many customary rules. The solution must be to increase the role of
developing nations in the process of norm creation, not to politicize
the Court. Professor Falk recognized the imperfect nature of his plu-,
ralistic proposal in his recent review of the Court's Nicaragua
decision:
* No other World Court judgment is as satisfying in the quality of its legal
reasoning,. . . [t]he implicit legal hegemony of Western approaches and
scholarship is nowhere evident, nor, it should be added, is there any
swing, latent or manifest, to. Third World or Marxist viewpoints. As
such, the majority opinion is of great help to all sectors of world public
opinion seeking to comprehend the contours of minimum world public
The possibility of legal universalism
order on matters of war and peace.
1 79
has been powerfully validated.
The difficulty even with Professor Falk's revised approach is that it
is universal in form, but pluralistic in effect. The fundamental substantive issue of the legality of U.S. actions under the U.N. Charter
was within the competence of the Court. The Court thought, however, that this issue was foreclosed by the Multilateral Treaty Reservation limiting the United States' acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
The Court chose to find a new principle of customary law and to perform this law declaring function by defining a new process of norm
creation to which there is no general agreement among nations. A
nation's vote for General Assembly resolutions became consent to the
legal rules contained therein. This in no way justifies the actions of the
United States government which the Court impliedly found violated
the U.N. Charter and the OAS charter. Rather, it illustrates that cus179. Falk, supra note 172, at 107. In a footnote Falk adjudges universal jurisprudence as
best, but prefers a pluralistic jurisprudence to a provincial Western one. Id. at 107 n. 1.
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tomary international law is a malleable concept that is indeterminate,
depending on the decisionmaker's perspective on norms and which
sources are perceived as legitimate.180 It could be used to justify as
well as proscribe the use of force. 18
Such a manipulation of universal principles is mirrored by the
Reisman/McDougal approach of taking general normative concepts
such as democracy and minimum world order and using them to jus182
tify actions in violation of positive principles of international law.
Interestingly, while Falk commended the Reisman/McDougal normative approach in his discussion of the South West Africa cases when its
advocates appeared to agree with his position, 83 this normative approach has since become a major legal justification for U.S. intervention and its adherents, the major critics of the Court's Nicaragua
decision with which Falk agrees.' 84 Advocates of a normative jurisprudence reach different conclusions depending upon which norms are
emphasized in different circumstances.
Recently Reisman has championed a new process for determining
international law, the incident methodology,1 85 which examines the reactions of "functional elites" to international incidents. Such reactions tend to be self-serving and reflective of power rather than legal
principles. 186 Such a reformulation of the process of norm creation
diminishes the authoritativeness of traditional sources'87 and again excludes developing nations from significant participation in the norm
creation process. The creation of legal norms would be the primary
domain of large developed nations with the military power to impose
its will during the "incident."
The incident process of norm development provides a mechanism
for denigrating the prohibition against the use of force in article 2(4).
Reisman, in his analysis of customary international law, finds nine ba180. Judge Bedjaoui makes the point that the Western nations that oppose giving the General Assembly law creating powers are the very nations that initiated transfer of power from a
blocked Security Council to the General Assembly in the Uniting for Peace Resolution in order
.
to approve military action. M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 132, at 178.
181. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 1.14 (justifying U.S. actions in Grenada, in part, under
customary law exceptions that he argues survive the U.N. Charter).
182. See Reisman, supra note 109, at 642-45.
183. R. FALK, supra note 7, at 96, 119.
184. See Reisman, Has the InternationalCourtExceeded Its Jurisdiction, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 8

(1986); Reisman, supra note 32, at 166.
185. INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS:

THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS (W.

Reisman & A. Willard eds. 1989); see also Reisman, Special Feature - The Incident as a Decisional Unit in InternationalLaw, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1-117 (1984).
186. Bowett, International Incidents: New Genre or New Delusion?, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 386,
392 (1987).
187. Id. at 386.
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sic categories that may support the unilateral use of force including a
broad doctrine of self-defense, uses of force within spheres of influence
and critical defense zones, and humanitarian intervention. 88 The key
criterion in determining whether the individual use of force is lawful
within these categories is whether it will enhance or undermine minimum world order. 8 9 The stated intent of intervention under this criterion is to increase the probability of free choice by indigenous
peoples of their political structure and government. While these are
worthy goals, the mechanism is the self-judging perceptions of the
world's military elite who just might act to enhance their perceived
self-interest regardless of its impact on the lives and political rights of
the recipient of such beneficence.
While this normative approach proceeds from a concern that the
U.N. Charter system for controlling the use of force has become impotent,' 90 its self-judging and subjective character may encourage violence rather than discourage it. Nations that might be on the receiving
end of such paternalism are understandably less enthusiastic. The
World Court specifically rejected intervention for reasons connected
with the domestic policies of a foreign state, its ideology, its level of
armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy.' 9 ' It specifically rejected the use of force as the appropriate method to insure respect for
human rights. 92 A similar normative approach to the use of force
might be developed through the cavalier use of U.N. resolutions to
permit intervention in aid of "self-determination." Self-determination,
while similarly a worthy goal, could be just as well manipulated for
the intervenors' self-interest as minimum world order. The World
Court specifically declined to discuss whether intervention in aid of
93
the process of decolonization would be a permissible intervention.
However, the World Court's expansive use of U.N. resolutions permits
such a possible outcome because it broadens the Court's ability to establish new norms through its interpretative powers.
International incidents function as the law-creating process to implement the Reisman/McDougal normative approach to international
law, just as the U.N. resolutions could become the norm-creating process to enact a Third World normative jurisprudence. Either manipu188. Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in InternationalLaw, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
279, 281 (1985).
189. Id. at 282.
190. Id. at 280.
191. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 109 (Merits: June 27).
192. Id. at 134-35. But see Teson, supra note 111.
193. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 109.
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lation of normative principles is unrelated to the consent of sovereign
nations and lacks a broad legitimacy in a diverse world. Either would
be disasterous for a cohesive international legal order.
An international jurisprudence if it is to be perceived as legitimate,
must be based on the consent of nations. The indeterminant and malleable concept of customary international law may have been an acceptable surrogate for actual consent when the participating
international community was small and relatively homogeneous. In
the twentieth century it has been used by different groups of nations to
attempt to impose norms without consent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court cannot be saved
by clever draftsmanship. Proposals for an armed hostilities, self-defense, or national security reservation are today's reaction to the most
recent problem by the well-intentioned. None of various proposals offered by international scholars and practitioners in these books and
articles deals effectively with the fundamental disagreements about the
content of international law and the process of norm creation.
A law of force reservation may plug one leak in the dike, but further leaks are inevitable. The fundamental disagreements about norms
and processes will reemerge at the World Court around other issues
including the very ones Thomas Franck mentioned as susceptible to
principled development - terrorism, freedom of the seas, and protection of foreign investment. Differing perspectives will create differing
conclusions about legal standards in these areas and compulsory jurisdiction will again be disfavored.
The Court's use of General Assembly Resolutions in the Nicaragua case portends further rancor about the process of norm creation.
Nations may be reluctant to vote for resolutions that might be construed as norm creating. In other substantive areas decisions can be
expected that will be unacceptable to the United States' vision of the
international legal order. For those with a sense of irony, the indeterminate concept of customary international law that has been used by
the West to impose rules on nonconsenting Third World nations is
now being used by the World Court to impose norms unacceptable to
the United States. Neither are good bases for a universal international
law. Both do violence to the concept of international law as a consensual body of rules developed by nations for their mutual self interest.
Proposals to permit the United States to choose the panel of judges
through the special chambers procedures would be, as was the Connally Reservation, a triumph of form over substance. Such a reserva-
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tion would permit the United States or, reciprocally, the other partylitigant, to escape compulsory jurisdiction by rejecting the panel. If
the co-litigant is a nation with a different perspective on the content
and process of international law, agreement on a panel is unlikely. If
the co-litigants have similar perspectives, then, as Professor Morrison
suggests, jurisdiction is essentially voluntary and could have been obtained by the special agreement procedures of article 36(1) without the
pretense of compulsory jurisdiction.
More fundamentally, the frequent use of special chambers procedures, voluntary or not, in contested substantive areas, is a prescription for a fragmented, pluralistic jurisprudence. The principles of law
applied and the result may be dependent on the composition of the
panel. Such a procedure may give new meaning to the admonition of
article 59 that the Court's decisions are only binding upon the parties.
Divergent results will only decrease respect for the Court and international law.
What is needed is a universal jurisprudence agreed upon by all nations. The little used and nearly powerless World Court is not the
proper institution to resolve fundamental disagreements about the
content of norms and how international law is made. The Court lacks
both the authority to do so and the power to impose its decisions.
Unlike a domestic supreme court, the World Court is not the final
interpreter of international law. Its jurisdictional mandate is limited
to disputes voluntarily referred to it either by an ad hoc agreement or
by a prior acceptance of jurisdiction. There is, as yet, no common
ethos of values, no constitution with vague natural law provisions such
as due process, equal protection, or natural justice entrusted to the
Court to interpret and impose on all states.
Proposals for a normative jurisprudence, whether based on Third
World control of the General Assembly or on the Reisman/McDougal
model of military elites pursuing their self-judging perception of community goals, will undermine the legitimacy of the international legal
order rather than promote it. International law is essentially a positivist enterprise where sovereign states place limits on their behavior in
their mutual self-interests. The development of an international law
worthy of its name, recognized as .legitimate by all major groups of
states, requires the agreement of nations of diverse cultures, ideologies, and experiences upon the norms and principles that will limit
their behavior. Neither the historical imposition of norms upon developing countries nor the use of a normative jurisprudence to change
international law are conclusive to a legitimate international legal
order.
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Changing Process of InternationalLaw

The world in the latter part of the 20th Century is an economically
interdependent one with the rapid movement of capital and technology. The United States, Japan, and the nations of the Third World are
all dependent upon international trade for increases in national income
and employment. Such interdependence creates common concerns
and needs despite cultural diversity. For example, the national origin
of end products has become blurred as component parts are manufactured in different countries around the globe, assembled, and then
exported. 194
There is a need for the development of international mechanisms
of cooperation to apportion jurisdiction and to regulate activities beyond the boundary of any one state. The frightening prospects of major climatic changes have propelled unwilling states to develop new
international legal regimes for environmental problems that defy a national solution.195 The nations of the world were able to.negotiate limits on the production and use of chlorofluorocarbons despite different
economic interests and divergent economic systems and political ideologies.' 96 Bargains can be struck around common concerns, and appropriate legal standards and regulatory mechanisms developed to
address international problems. These bargains (negotiated legal standards) must be determined by sovereign states not by the World
Court.
The increased economic interdependence of the world has created
the conditions for negotiated bargins to achieve common concerns.
197
However, a fundamental problem remains: the world's domestic
and international 1 98 political institutions have not kept pace with the
rapid technological changes that are creating common concerns. Solutions to common concerns require consent if they are to be perceived
as legitimate. Advances in telecommunications and information tech194. Blumenthal, The World Economy and Technological Change, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 529,
537 (1988).
195. J. BRUNNEE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND REGULATION 62 (1988). See generally L. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY (1984); see also President's Message to Joint Session of Congress, 25 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. (Supp. Building a Better America 84, 94-95) (Feb. 9, 1989) (President asserts that
unilateral action by the United States will not solve the problem of climactic change).
196. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). This agreement is a protocol to the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.53/5/Rev. 1,reprinted
in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987).
197. Blumenthal, supra note 194, at 540; see also Asahi Metal Ind. Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (Supreme Court struggles with personal jurisdiction
over Japanese manufacturer of tire value assemblies used in tire tubes produced in Taiwan and
exported to California).
198. Blumenthal, supra note 194, at 532.
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nology have increased economic and political expectations around the
globe. The citizenry in developing nations and Communist Bloc nations are demanding economic growth and development.' 9 9 This
political pressure inclines governments to attract capital and technology for economic growth. The opportunity is present for the negotiation of legal principles to protect capital investment and to regularize
legal relations between countries in a manner perceived as legitimate
by all major groups of countries.
The multilateral treaty process encourages negotiation and compromise. It may also change a nation's perspective about the relative
merits of a new norm. During the early rounds of negotiation of the
Law of the Sea Convention, the United States insisted that customary
international law defined the limit of the territorial sea at three miles
and no new standard would be accepted. Later the number of nations
asserting broader jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles doubled, imperiling
the free movement of U.S. ships and submarines. 2°° The United States
finally determined that it was to its advantage to agree to a consensus
standard that would stop the expanding territorial claims. 20 1 Compromise is essential if nations with diverse interests and cultures are to
ever agree on norms that meet mutual interests. Agreement is essential if the norms are to be accorded legitimacy and followed. The present mode of posturing about legal norms and the process of norm
creation discourages respect for law and encourages manipulation.
The negotiation of universal principles will be difficult and painful.
It will be painful because it requires the jettisoning of deeply held beliefs about the content and process of international law. Until this
arduous task of compromise and negotiation is undertaken, the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction will be a meaningless gesture accompanied by self-satisfied statements signifying nothing.

199. Our Chip Has Come In, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 12, 1989, p.7; see Dordick, The
Emerging World Information Business, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 69 (1983).
200. J. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 74-75 (1984).
201. Id. at 75.

